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ABSTRACT 
Industrial control system communication networks are vulnerable to reconnaissance, response injection, 
command injection, and denial of service attacks. Such attacks can lead to an inability to monitor and control 
industrial control systems and can ultimately lead to system failure. This can result in financial loss for control 
system operators and economic and safety issues for the citizens who use these services. This paper describes 
a set of 28 cyber attacks against industrial control systems which use the MODBUS application layer network 
protocol. The paper also describes a set of standalone and state based intrusion detection system rules which 
can be used to detect cyber attacks and to store evidence of attacks for post incident analysis. All attacks 
described in this paper were validated in a laboratory environment. The detection rate of the intrusion 
detection system rules presented by attack class is also presented. 
Keywords: cyber security, intrusion detection system, industrial control system, cyber physical system 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial control systems, also called Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) control 
systems, and process control systems, have a 
strategic importance due to the fact that they are 
adopted by the critical infrastructure of 
industrialized nations. There have been several real-
world documented incidents and cyber attacks 
affecting industrial control systems, which clearly 
illustrate critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.  
Team Cymru, a specialized Internet security 
research firm, released a briefing paper (Santorelli, 
2009) which discussed malicious port scan activity 
against their DarkNet (a honey pot) searching for 
open ports on port numbers commonly associated 
with SCADA system network protocols. This report 
showed heavy scanning activity from four areas: 
Asia, North America, Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe. The report cited heavy scanning of DNP3 
ports from Russia and Taiwan and heavy scanning 
activities for MODBUS related ports in Western 
Europe and China. This port scanning is potentially 
indicative of attackers searching for SCADA 
systems for later attacks. Stuxnet (Falliere, O’Murchu, 
& Chien, 2011) is the first known worm to target an 
industrial control system. Stuxnet targeted 
computers running the Siemens WinCC SCADA 
software product. Infected systems had a dynamic 
link library (DLL) used by the WinCC Step7 tool 
replaced with a malicious DLL. The worm then 
monitored communications between the WinCC tool 
and a remote terminal. If a specific signature related 
to the remote terminal was found, firmware on the 
remote terminal was replaced with malicious code. 
In a third incident in January 2000, a disgruntled 
engineer attacked the Maroochy Shire Council’s 
sewage control system in Queensland, Australia. A 
pump in the control system failed to start or stop 
when specified and alarms failed to alert. This attack 
caused approximately 264,000 gallons of raw 
sewage to leak to into nearby rivers (Slay & Miller, 
2007). Finally, in 2003, the Davis-Besse nuclear 
plant in Oak Harbor Ohio was attacked by the 
Slammer Worm which caused a safety monitoring 
system of the plant go offline for approximately five 
hours (Poulsen, 2009).  
Forensic systems to detect and store evidence of a 
cyber attacks against SCADA control systems are 
not common. Cyber attacks against SCADA control 
systems may occur at nodes typically found in 
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enterprise systems such as personal computers, 
network switches, servers, or firewalls. Cyber 
attacks may also be directed at devices specific to 
SCADA control systems such as programmable 
logic controllers (PLC), programmable automation 
controllers (PAC), remote terminal units (RTU), 
master terminal units (MTU), and intelligent 
electronic devices (IED). This paper addresses a 
forensic solution to detect attacks against MODBUS 
clients and servers.  
This paper has 2 primary contributions. First, 
MODBUS is a network communication protocol 
commonly used in industrial control systems 
throughout many industries.  This paper presents a 
set of 28 attacks against MODBUS control systems. 
Attacks are grouped into 4 categories; 
reconnaissance, response injection, command 
injection, and denial of service. Each attack is 
described in detail. All of the attacks presented in 
this paper were implemented and validated in a 
laboratory environment against 2 control systems 
built with commercial hardware and software; a gas 
pipeline system and a storage tank. Second, this 
paper presents a state based signature intrusion 
detection system designed to detect and alert for 
each of the 28 cyber attacks. All rules were tested in 
a laboratory setting and this paper provides detection 
accuracy results. The intrusion detection system and 
rules described in this paper can be used to detect 
attacks real time.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, 
a section on related works is provided. Next, the 28 
cyber attacks are presented. Next, the signature 
based intrusion detection system is discussed. 
Finally, conclusions and future work are offered. 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
Many attacks against industrial control systems have 
been described in literature. These attacks highlight 
the threat to industrial control systems and 
emphasize the need for tools to capture network 
traffic related to cyber security attacks. A stealthy 
attack was developed which steals water from an 
irrigation canal which used SCADA equipment to 
track water usage (Amin, Litrico, Sastry, & Bayen, 
2013). Multiple cyber attack scenarios including 
malicious command injection and man-in-the-
middle attacks to change process measurements 
from a wind turbine are presented in (Yan, Liu, & 
Govindarasu, 2011). The Siemens Simatic S7 PLC 
has been the subject of extensive review for cyber 
vulnerabilities. Reconnaissance, fingerprint, replay, 
authentication bypass, and remote attacks against the 
Siemens Simatic S7 PLC are presented in 
(Beresford, 2011). A taxonomy of energy control 
system vulnerabilities lists probe, flood, bypass, 
terminate, execute, modify and deletion attacks 
(Fleury, Khurana, & Welch, 2009). Bulk power 
transmission systems use state estimation algorithms 
to plan for power system contingencies. Altered 
current and voltage measurements in power systems 
can lead to financial loss and misoperation of the 
power system (Liu, Reiter, Ning, 2009; Xie, Mo, 
Sinopoli, 2010).   
Digital forensics capabilities for industrial control 
systems are limited (Nance, Hay, & Bishop, 2009). 
Most process control systems store significant 
information about process measurements and 
process control decisions.  Industrial control systems 
lack forensic tools to capture and store network 
traffic which may provide evidence of a malicious 
intrusion. Research is needed to determine the types 
of information which should be collected and to 
determine where to place devices to collect 
information (Valli, 2009). A forensic architecture 
which identifies locations to collect forensic 
information for industrial control systems has been 
proposed (Chandia, Gonzalez, Kilpatrick, Papa, & 
Shenoi, 2007). The use of the Snort IDS to capture 
forensic evidence from industrial control system 
which use the MODBUS network protocol has been 
proposed in (Slay & Sitnikova, 2009). A data logger 
to capture and store MODBUS/RTU and 
MODBUS/ASCII network traffic was proposed in 
(Morris & Pavurapu, 2010). A retrofit intrusion 
detection system is described in (Morris, Vaughn, 
Dandass, 2012). This system was used to 
demonstrate that 11 of 14 open source Snort rules 
written for the MODBUS/TCP protocol are also 
applicable to the MODBUS/RTU and 
MODBUS/ASCII protocols. This work was 
extended to include 50 Snort rules to detect protocol 
mutation attacks against MODBUS servers (Morris, 
Vaughn, & Dandass, 2013). 
The MODBUS protocol (MODBUS-IDA, 2006) is 
widely used for industrial control systems. This 
acceptance in industry is partially related to the 
simplicity of the protocol. MODBUS collectively 
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refers to MODBUS over Serial Line and 
MODBUS/TCP protocols. 
MODBUS over Serial Line traffic includes two 
modes; RTU and ASCII.  RTU mode packets are 
binary and transmit a single bit for each bit in an 
application data unit (ADU). ASCII mode packets 
convert each byte transmitted to a single ASCII 
character. Frame delimiters differ for each mode. 
RTU mode uses dead space on the line to delimit 
packets, while ASCII mode uses reserved ASCII 
characters to delimit the start and end of frames. 
RTU mode appends a cyclic redundancy code 
(CRC) to the end of each frame. ASCII mode 
packets end with a linear redundancy code (LRC). 
The MODBUS protocol data unit (PDU) includes a 
function code and payload. The function code 
specifies the type of transaction. Payload contents 
are specific to the function code.
 
 
Figure 1 MODBUS Protocol Data Unit (PDU) and Application Data Units (ADU) 
 
MODBUS/TCP is a transmission control protocol 
(TCP) based protocol intended for use on routable 
user datagram protocol (UDP) or internet protocol 
(IP) networks. The PDU for MODBUS/TCP is the 
same as the PDU for MODBUS over Serial Line.  
The MODBUS/TCP PDU is prepended with a 
MODBUS application protocol (MBAP) header 
which includes a transaction identifier, protocol 
identifier, length, and unit identifier.  The transaction 
identifier is a unique value for each query and 
response pair. This is usually a counter. The protocol 
identifier specifies the protocol version and is 
always 0. The length parameter specifies the length 
in bytes of the rest of the packet. The unit identifier 
is a unique value corresponding to the target slave. 
The unit identifier is analogous to the MODBUS 
over serial line address. MODBUS/TCP does not 
include a CRC. Rather, transmission error detection 
is provided by the TCP packet. Figure 1 shows the 
MODBUS PDU, MODBUS ADU for MODBUS 
over Serial Line and MODBUS TCP, and the 
MODBUS MBAP header. 
The MODBUS protocol is very simple. Generally 
MODBUS packets come in pairs. A master node 
sends a query and a slave node sends a response. 
This query/response paradigm is the most common 
form of communication. Broadcast packets are 
allowed in which case there is no response.   
Neither MODBUS over Serial Line or 
MODBUS/TCP include features to prevent replay 
attacks or to provide a method to authenticate the 
sender. MODBUS vulnerabilities have been well 
discussed in literature. The MODBUS/TCP protocol 
has been the subject of multiple vulnerability 
studies. MODBUS/TCP systems are vulnerable to 
denial of service attacks from compromised human 
machine interface hosts and man-in-the-middle 
attacks due to a lack of a digital signature to sign 
network frames (Mallouhi, Al-Nashif, Cox, 
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Chadaga, & Hariri, 2011). The lack of digital 
signature or other means to ensure the integrity of 
network frames in industrial control systems leads to 
many vulnerabilities. Altered process measurements 
can lead operators to take incorrect control actions 
based on malicious fake data and injected commands 
can cause systems to take unwanted control actions 
(Huang, et al., 2009; Sridhar, & Manimaran, 2010). 
A separate comprehensive attack taxonomy with 
some overlap with this paper is available in 
(Huitsing, Chandia, Papa, & Shenoi, 2008). In 
summary, cyber penetration of control systems 
monitoring and controlling MODBUS based 
industrial control systems can lead to loss of the 
visibility and control.Industrial control systems 
implement feedback control loops to monitor and 
control the systems. Figure 2 shows a typical 
industrial control system configuration with three 
feedback control loops. The first feedback control 
loop connects a programmable logic controller 
(PLC) to sensors and actuators which in turn connect 
to the physical process. This feedback control loop 
does not use network protocols. The connections are 
made using analog and digital inputs and outputs on 
the PLC. The PLC implements a program to perform 
distributed control actions. For safety reasons the 
PLC can typically control the physical process 
without a network connection to the human machine 
interface (HMI) or master terminal unit (MTU) or 
other upstream components. The second feedback 
control loop is from the PLC to the HMI or MTU.  
The HMI/MTU are typically connected to the PLC 
with a network which may be implemented via many 
physical layers (Ethernet, Serial, wireless, etc.) and 
many transport, network, and application layer 
protocols (TCP/IP, RS-232, Zigbee, MODBUS, 
DNP3, etc.). The HMI/MTU continually queries the 
PLC for sensor measurements. The HMI/MTU may 
implement a system level control algorithm. The last 
feedback control loop is the presentation of process 
information to a human operator. The human in 
presented with system state information and the 
human provides supervisory control such as process 
limits, system state, system control scheme.  
 
 
Figure 2 Typical Industrial Control System Feedback Control Loops 
 
3. ATTACKS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The set of attacks described in this paper are grouped into four categories; reconnaissance, response injection, 
command injection, and denial of service. Reconnaissance attacks gather control system network information, 
map the network architecture, and identify the device characteristics such as manufacturer, model number, 
supported network protocols, system address, and system memory map. Response injection attacks attempt 
to present invalid sensor information, process measurements and process state to the controller of a feedback 
control loop. Command injection attacks attempt to inject invalid commands which cause incorrect control 
actions. Denial of service attacks attempt to disrupt or break the communication links which implement the 
feedback control loops. This paper is limited to attacks to the link between the HMI/MTU and the PLC. For 
the work in this paper this link was implemented with the MODBUS application layer protocol. 
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Signature based Snort intrusion detection rules were written to detect the attacks described in this section.  
Table 1 and Table 2 provide a cross reference for attacks versus associated IDS rule for each attack. The 
remainder of this section describes the attacks listed in Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
Table 1 Reconnaissance and Response Injection Attacks versus IDS Rule Cross Reference 
Name Associated Intrusion Detection Rule 
Address Scan 3.1 RTU/ASCII INVALID ADDRESS 
3.2 TCP INVALID ADDRESS 
Function Code Scan 3.3 FUNCTION CODE SCAN 
Device Identification  3.4 DEVICE ID SCAN 
Points Scan 3.5 WRITE POINTS SCAN 
3.6 READ POINTS SCAN 
3.7 INVALID ADDRESS 
Memory Dump  3.6 READ POINTS SCAN 
Naïve Read Payload Injection 3.16 INVALID RESPONSE PAYLOAD CONTENT 
Invalid Read Payload Size 3.16 INVALID RESPONSE PAYLOAD CONTENT 
Naïve False Error Response 3.18 INVALID ERROR RESPONSE 
Negative Sensor Measurement(s) 4.1 Pipeline Negative Pressure Response 
4.2 STORAGE TANK FILL LEVEL NEGATIVE RESPONSE 
Sensor Measurement Grossly Out of 
Bounds 
4.3 Pipeline Measurement Out-of-bounds 
4.4 STORAGE TANK MEASUREMENT OUT-OF-BOUNDS 
Sporadic Sensor Measurement Injection 4.5 PIPELINE MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF CHANGE 
4.6 STORAGE TANK MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF 
CHANGE 
Random Sensor Measurement Injection 4.5 PIPELINE MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF CHANGE 
4.6 STORAGE TANK MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF 
CHANGE 
Constant Sensor Measurement Injection 4.9 PIPELINE CONSTANT MEASUREMENT 
High Slope Measurement Injection 4.5 Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of Change 
4.6 Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate of Change 
Low Slope Measurement Injection 4.7 Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of Change 
4.8 Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate of Change 
Calculated Measurement Injection 4.5 Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of Change 
4.6 Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate of Change 
4.7 Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of Change 
4.8 Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate of Change 
Replayed Measurement Injection 4.5 Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of Change 
4.6 Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate of Change 
4.7 Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of Change 
4.8 Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate of Change 
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Likely threat actors for the attacks described in this 
section are either insiders with access to the network 
attached to the master or slave or malware which 
penetrates the network and installs malicious code 
on a machine on the vulnerable network. For 
MODBUS over Serial Line systems, attacks will 
generally originate from the computer which hosts 
the HMI or from an infected PLC. For 
MODBUS/TCP systems, the primary target would 
be any computer reach the master and slave devices 
via network communication. TCP networks often 
include firewalls which use access control lists to 
limit traffic on a network. In this case, an attack can 
only be launched from computers with permission to 
communicate with the MODBUS master, slave or 
other device in the feedback loop (such as a 
historian). Many industrial control systems 
implement communication links using wireless 
technologies. These wireless technologies, whether 
proprietary or standardized, are vulnerable to attack 
(Reaves & Morris, 2012). Computers which 
penetrate wireless links can launch attacks against 
both MODBUS over Serial Line and 
MODBUS/TCP systems.
Table 2 Command Injection and Denial of Service Attacks versus IDS Rule Cross Reference 
Name Associated Intrusion Detection Rule 
Altered System Control Scheme 4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State 
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State 
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State 
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State 
Altered Actuator State 4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State 
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State 
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State 
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State 
Continually Altered Actuator State 4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State 
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State 
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State 
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State 
Altered PID Parameter(s) 3.8 Invalid PID Parameter 
4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State 
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State 
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State 
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State 
Altered Control Set Point 3.9 Pipeline Invalid Set Point 
3.10 Storage Tank Invalid Set Point 
4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State 
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State 
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State 
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State 
Force Listen Only Mode 3.11 Force Listen Only Mode 
Restart Communication 3.12 Restart Communication 
Clear Data Log 3.13 Clear Communications Event Log 
Change ASCII Input Delimiter 3.14 Change ASCII Input Delimiter 
Invalid Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) 4.14 Invalid CRC Count 
MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming 4.15 MODBUS Flood 
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3.1 Gas Pipeline and Storage Tank Test Bed 
The attacks and rules presented in this paper were 
developed and tested in laboratory environment 
(Morris, et al., 2011). Testing was performed on two 
laboratory scale control systems; a water storage 
tank and a gas pipeline system. The water storage 
tank models an oil storage tank control system used 
to monitor oil inventory and distribute oil to refinery 
processes. The pipeline control system models a 
pipeline used to move natural gas or other petroleum 
products to market. Both control systems include a 
master terminal unit (MTU) and remote terminal 
unit (RTU) connected with a MODBUS/RTU 
network. Operators can remotely monitor and 
control both systems using the HMI. The HMI polls 
the RTU for system state periodically.  
The storage tank control system includes a pump to 
fill the storage tank, a gravity fed manual relieve 
valve which allows water to drain from the tank, and 
a sensor which provides the water level in the 
primary tank as a percentage of total capacity. The 
storage tank is an on/off control system which turns 
the pump on and off to keep the water level between 
high (H) and low (L) set points. 
The pipeline control system contains a closed loop 
gas pipeline connected to an air pump which pumps 
air into the pipeline. A solenoid controlled release 
valve can be opened to release air pressure from the 
pipeline. A pressure sensor is attached to the pipeline 
which allows pressure visibility at the pipeline and 
remotely on an HMI screen. The pipeline uses a 
proportional integral derivative control scheme to 
control the pump or solenoid relief valve based upon 
system configuration.  
Ladder logic is used to program the RTU connected 
to the meters and actuators of both systems. Both 
systems include registers to store set points which 
are adjusted via the human machine interface (HMI) 
software connected to the master node. Pipeline set 
points include system mode (manual, automatic, or 
off), manual pump override (on, off), manual relief 
valve override (open or closed), target pressure, and 
PID configuration set points. The gas pipeline 
includes pump state, relief valve state, and pressure 
measurement output registers. The storage tank RTU 
ladder logic includes H and L level, HH and LL 
alarm level, system mode (manual, automatic, or 
off), and manual pump override (on, off) set points. 
The storage tank RTU ladder logic also includes 3 
output registers which store process parameters; 
pump state, water level, and alarm state. 
To perform the attacks described in this paper a 
serial bump in the wire was used. This bump in the 
wire continuously logs all MODBUS over Serial 
Line traffic. The bump in the wire also includes 
hooks to alter, delay, or drop packets. The bump in 
the wire also includes hooks to inject traffic in either 
direction on the serial link. 
3.2 Reconnaissance Class Attacks 
Four reconnaissance attacks were implemented for 
this work. First, the address scan attack sends 
MODBUS queries to all legal MODBUS addresses 
listening for responses. Implemented MODBUS 
addresses will respond with an error message or a 
message indicating success. Non-implemented 
addresses will lead to no response. The attack 
implemented for this paper walks through each legal 
address (0…247) to build a list of implemented 
addresses. The function code scan attack is similar 
to the address scan except that it walks through all 
legal MODBUS function code scans to builds a list 
of implemented function codes by connected 
address. As with the address scan attack, the function 
code attack detects implemented function codes 
based upon device response. Invalid function codes 
provide a specific invalid function code exception. 
The device identification attack uses two read device 
identification functions built-in to the MODBUS 
protocol to learn PLC run status, vendor name, the 
product code, and the major, minor revision, vendor 
uniform resource locator (URL), the product name, 
the model name, the user application name, and 
other device specific information. This information 
can be used to search for known vulnerabilities in 
published vulnerability databases. The point scan 
attack creates a map of implemented MODBUS data 
block addresses (coils, discrete inputs, holding 
registers, and input registers) for an identified 
MODBUS device address. Point scan attacks 
attempt to read from and write to each legal data 
block address and use MODBUS response codes to 
determine which addresses are implemented and 
which are not. The last reconnaissance attack is the 
memory dump attack. The memory dump attack 
attempts to read the contents of all PLC data blocks. 
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3.3 Response Injection Class Attacks 
Response injection attacks affect network traffic 
from MODBUS server to client (responses to 
MODBUS queries). Response injection attacks take 
3 forms. First, response injection attacks can 
originate from malicious control of a programmable 
logic controller or remote terminal unit. Second, 
response injection attacks can capture network 
packets and alter contents during transmission from 
server to client. Finally, response injection attacks 
may be crafted and injected into the network by a 
third party device. 
Naïve malicious response injection (NMRI) attacks 
lack knowledge of the physical system or its control 
logic. A Naïve Read Payload Attack has a payload 
made up of random contents, all zeroes, or all ones. 
This attack is called naïve because no knowledge of 
the physical system or its control logic is required. 
The Invalid Read Payload Size Attack is an altered 
or injected MODBUS packet whose payload length 
does not match the quantity of objects requested by 
the previous MODBUS query. The Naïve False 
Error Response Attack injects false error responses 
for valid queries by setting the response function 
code to the query function code plus 0x80 and 
providing a valid or invalid MODBUS exception 
code. The Negative Sensor Measurement Attack is 
an altered or injected MODBUS response packet 
which includes negative values for measurements 
which do not typically report negative values. For 
example, pipeline pressure and water tank percent 
full should both be positive and a negative value for 
either measurement would be obviously incorrect. 
The Sensor Measurements Grossly Out-Of-Bounds 
Attack injects process measurements significantly 
outside the bounds of alarm set points. Figure 3 is an 
example of a Sensor Measurements Grossly Out-Of-
Bounds Attack. The measurements labeled NMRI 
are far out of bounds and easy to detect.
 
 
Figure 3 Sensor Measurements Grossly Out-of-Bounds Attack 
 
The Sporadic Sensor Measurement Injection Attack 
injects false process measurements outside the 
bounds of H and L control set points while not 
outside the alarm set point range formed by HH and 
LL. The Random Sensor Measurement Injection 
Attack injects random process measurements for the 
pipeline pressure and water tank water level. Since 
these measurement values are random some falsified 
measurements are within process limits (LL/HH and 
L/H limits) and some are not. 
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Figure 4 CMRI High Slope Measurement Injection Attack 
 
Complex Malicious Response Injection (CMRI) 
attacks appear similar to normal system behavior 
through knowledge of the system being attacked. 
The Constant Sensor Measurement Injection Attack 
injects malicious packets containing the same 
measurement over a period of time in order to mask 
the real state of the system. The Calculated Sensor 
Measurement Injection Attack injects process 
measurements using some model of the physical 
process which is used to predict behavior. The 
Replayed Measurement Injection Attack injects 
previously collected measurements captured from 
eavesdropping on system communications. The 
replayed measurement and calculated sensor 
measurement injection attacks are quite similar to 
one another except for their source of measurement 
values to inject. The High Frequency Measurement 
Injection Attack injects measurements in a normal 
range which changes at a faster rate than the normal 
system behavior. The Low Frequency Measurement 
Injection Attack injects measurements in a normal 
range which changes at a lower rate than the normal 
system behavior. Figure 4 is an example of a High 
Frequency Measurement Injection Attack against a 
storage tank.  
3.4 Command Injection Attacks 
Command injection attacks inject false control and 
configuration commands into a control system. 
Malicious State Command Injection (MSCI) attacks 
change the state of the process control system 
abnormally to drive the system from a safe state to a 
critical state by sending malicious commands to 
remote field devices. Many control systems include 
automatic and manual modes. The Altered System 
Mode Attack injects a command to switch between 
manual and automatic mode. The Altered Actuator 
State Attack changes a system actuator state. For 
example, a pump may be turned on or off or a switch 
opened or closed. The Continually Altered Actuator 
State Attack repeatedly alters the state of an actuator 
in a system. This may be done to attempt to cause 
physical damage to a system component. 
Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI) 
attacks change parameters used by control schemes 
on a device to cause incorrect system behavior. The 
Altered Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) 
Parameter Attack changes PID control parameters. 
Changing PID parameters can cause the controller to 
perform incorrect control actions. The Altered 
Control Set Point Attack changes device set points. 
Set points are typically used to provide variable 
control over a system. For example the storage tank 
system uses an ON/OFF control scheme to keep the 
amount of liquid in a tank between a low set point 
and a high set point.  
Malicious Function Code Injection (MFCI) attacks 
use function codes which specify functions which 
can be used to cause denial of service attacks or to 
erase evidence of other attacks. The Force Listen 
Only Mode Attack injects a command which causes 
a MODBUS server (a PLC) to no longer transmit on 
the network. This denial of service will lead to loss 
of the ability to remotely monitor and control a 
system. The Restart Communication Attack injects a 
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command which causes the MODBUS server to 
restart which leads to a temporary loss of 
communication. This loss of communication leads to 
a temporary inability to observe and control the 
process. The Clear Communications Event Log 
Attack clears the MODBUS server’s 
communications event log. This attack may be used 
to erase evidence of a prior attack. The Change 
ASCII Input Delimiter Attack changes the frame 
delimiter used for MODBUS ASCII devices to 
identify the start and end of a network frame. Such a 
change would cause a denial of service. 
3.5 Denial of Service Attacks 
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks attempt to break 
communication links to prevent remote monitoring 
or control of a system. This section documents two 
DOS attacks which require large volumes of injected 
packets. The Force Listen Only Mode, Restart 
Communication, and Change ASCII Input Delimiter 
attacks are also denial of service attacks. These three 
were listed in the command injection attack section 
because they require an injected MODBUS 
command to initiate, whereas, the DOS attacks in 
this section require large volumes of traffic to 
initiate.  
The Invalid Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) attack 
injects large volumes of MODBUS packets with 
incorrect CRC. Packets with invalid CRC are 
rejected by both MODBUS servers and clients. The 
victim device must check the CRC of each packet. A 
flood of packets with invalid CRC can overwhelm a 
device causing slow system responses or no system 
responses due to a crashed network stack.  
The MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming Attack 18 is 
specific to a proprietary wireless communication 
system. The proprietary wireless radio includes a 
carrier sense back off arbitration scheme which 
causes legitimate slaves to wait for a clear line to 
transmit. In laboratory experiments, attackers were 
able to force a legitimate slave to stay idle ad 
infinitum by continuously transmitting from a 3rd 
radio connected to the network. Figure 5 shows the 
impact of the MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming 
Attack against a storage tank from the perspective of 
the HMI. When the attack starts the HMI no longer 
receives responses to its water level queries and 
therefore the water level in the plot no longer 
changes. 
 
Figure 5 MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming Attack Effect 
 
4. SIGNATURE BASED INTRUSION 
DETECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
This section provides a set of rules for a signature 
based intrusion detection system. The rules 
described in the section are designed to detect the 
attacks described previously. The rules are divided 
into two types; standalone and state-based rules. The 
set of rules developed for this work are listed in 
Table 3 and Table 4. Standalone rules parse a single 
MODBUS packet looking for a match to a specific 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 9(1) 
47 
signature. If the signature is present in the parsed 
packet then the packet is classified as a match and an 
alert is issued. The standalone rules are implemented 
using the Snort intrusion detection tool. The second 
type of rule is called state based. State based rules 
require knowledge from previous MODBUS packets 
or from another source, such as a process sensor. 
This extra knowledge may be related to the protocol 
state or the state of the industrial control system 
being monitored. State based rules are processed 
using a Snort pre-processor, hence forth referred to 
as the state based layer. Snort passes the MODBUS 
payload in its entirety to the state based layer. The 
state based layer is written in the C programming 
language. A set of C-language structures were 
developed to store the state of the MODBUS 
protocol and a historical model of the state of the 
industrial control system. The model of the state of 
the industrial control system is system specific and 
requires expert knowledge to develop. The protocol 
state structure stores the last received MODBUS 
packet. The historical state for the industrial control 
system holds the command state and the process 
state. The command state is updated each time a 
command is sent to a MODBUS server. For the 
pipeline, the command state includes items such as 
the on/off state of the pump, the open/closed state of 
the relief valve, the system mode (manual or 
automatic), copies of set points, and other process 
specific control information. The process state 
includes measurements related to the process. For 
the pipeline, the process state includes the last 
pressure reading and other system measurements. 
Figure 6 shows the intrusion detection system 
architecture with separate standalone and state based 
layers.  For this work, a tap cable was added which 
allowed monitoring of all MODBUS over Serial line 
traffic. The tap cable includes only a receive pin and 
therefore cannot transmit. The tap cable monitored 
traffic between the MODBUS master PLC and slave 
PLC (aka RTU). A gasket which converts MODBUS 
over Serial Line traffic to MODBUS/TCP traffic 
was used to feed traffic to Snort for monitoring. For 
MODBUS/TCP systems a port mirror can be used to 
capture traffic on the network.  
  
 
Figure 6 Intrusion Detection System Architecture 
 
4.1 Snort Rule Descriptions 
In this section and in Table 1 and Table 2 signature 
based IDS rules are referred to using the notation 
table number dot rule number (t.r). For example 
Rule 3.1 is the first rule in Table 3 and Rule 4.2 is 
the second rule in Table 4. 
Table 3 lists the standalone rules. Rules 3.1-3.7 are 
used to detect reconnaissance attacks. MODBUS 
address scans differ based upon the upper network 
layers. MODBUS/TCP address scans search for IP 
addresses with MODBUS servers. MODBUS RTU 
and ASCII use a 1 byte address field. MODBUS 
RTU and ASCII address scans search for address 
values which provoke a response. MODBUS 
systems typically have a static set of member nodes 
each with a fixed address. A white list of system 
address, whether IP addresses or 1 byte addresses for 
MODBUS RTU and ASCII systems, can be 
developed. Rules 3.1 and 3.2 are used to detect 
State Based
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Snort
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PLC/HMI
PLC/RTU 
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Alert 
Log
traffic alerts
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MODBUS Traffic
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packets which are addressed to a system not in 
address white lists.  
A system specific white list can be developed which 
includes all legal function codes a MODBUS server 
supports. The function code white list can include all 
public MODBUS function codes and any user 
defined function codes. However, many systems use 
only a subset of the public MODBUS function 
codes. As such the function code white list should be 
limited to function codes used by the system being 
protected. Rule 3.3 alerts if a packet is received 
which includes a function code not in the function 
code white list.   
Device ID scans are detected with Rule 3.4 which 
alerts if the function code is 0x11 or 0x2B. Since the 
allowed function code white list will not include 
function codes 0x11 and 0x2B Rule 3.3 will also 
alert for Device ID attacks. Care should be taken 
when implementing the device ID scan rule since it 
effectively bars operators from reading device IDs. 
If reading the device ID is required the device ID 
scan rule should be updated accordingly.  
Point scans are detected using 3 rules. First, Rules 
3.5 and 3.6 use address white lists to detect read and 
write transaction addresses for non-existing or black 
listed memory regions. There is a write-able regions 
white list and a read-able regions white list. These 
white lists include a list of contiguous address 
regions which allow memory writes and reads 
respectively. Rules 3.5 and 3.6 rules confirm the 
start address is within the white listed address 
region. Rules 3.5 and 3.6 also compute the end 
address and confirm the end address is within the 
white listed address region. The end address is 
computed by adding the read or write length to the 
start address. The length value is available for all 
write and read function codes. Rules 3.5 and 3.6 are 
implemented as separate rules for each write and 
read function code. They are described here as two 
rules for simplicity. Rule 3.7 is also used to detect 
point scans. Rule 3.7 alerts if an invalid address 
exception code is detected for a read or write 
function code. Properly functioning MODBUS 
clients should not attempt to access an address which 
is not configured for reading on the target MODBUS 
server. As such any instance of the invalid address 
exception code is evidence of a points scan. Rule 3.7 
is not adequate to detect all point scans as it is 
possible certain memory regions are available on a 
MODBUS server by default while not actually in use 
for the specific control system being protected. The 
white lists associated with Rules 3.5 and 3.6 should 
only include address regions needed for the specific 
control system being protected. Rule 3.6 is also used 
to detect memory dump attacks. The read address 
white list should only include read addresses 
reserved for access through the network and should 
not include addresses used for internal program 
variables.  
Rule 3.8 alerts when a command to set PID 
parameters to an invalid value is detected. The 
pipeline system uses a PID controller to open and 
close the relief valve to keep the pressure within the 
high (H) and low (L) set points. Small changes in 
PID parameters can lead to drastic changes in system 
behavior. As such, Rule 3.8 alerts for any change in 
any of the five PID parameters; gain, rate, reset, dead 
band, and cycle time. In systems where PID values 
are regularly changed, this type of rule can include 
valid ranges for PID values.  
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Table 3 MODBUS Standalone Intrusion Detection Rules 
Number Name Description 
1 RTU/ASCII Invalid Address packet address address white list 
2 TCP Invalid Address IP address IP address white list 
3 Function Code Scan packet function code  function code white list 
4 Device ID Scan function code  {0x11, 0x2B} 
5 Write Points Scan (start address && end address) write address region 
white list 
6 Read Points Scan (start address && end address) read address region 
white list 
7 Invalid Address Response & function code {0x81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 
8F, 90, 95, 96, A2, A3, A4} & exception code = 02 
8 Invalid PID Parameter gain != 115 | rate != 0 | reset != 0.2 | deadband != 0.5 | 
cycle time != 1.0 
9 Pipeline Invalid Set Point P > 30 | L < 5 
10 Storage Tank Invalid Set Point H > 80 | L < 20 | HH > 90 | LL < 10 
11 Force Listen Only Mode function code = 0x08 &  
sub-function = 0x0004 
12 Restart Communication function code = 0x08 &  
sub-function = 0x0001 
13 Clear Communications Event 
Log 
function code = 0x08 &  
sub-function = 0x0001& 
data = 0xFF00 
14 Change ASCII Input Delimiter function code = 0x08 &  
sub-function = 0x0003 
15 Illegal Packet Length Packet length > 255 
16 Invalid Response Payload 
Content 
Response & function code is 0x80 & each byte in 
payload is 0x00 or 0Xff 
17 Invalid Response Payload Size Response & function code is 0x80 & payload size != 
request payload size in the command 
18 Invalid Error Response Function code is 0x80 & exception code !{0x1, 2, 3, 4} 
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Table 4 MODBUS State Based Intrusion Detection Rules 
Number Name Description 
1 Pipeline Pressure Negative Response Response & function code = 03& point 
address = 04 & value <0 
2 Storage Tank Fill Level Negative 
Response 
Response & function code = 03 & point 
address = 07 & value <0 
3 Pipeline Measurement Out-of-bounds Response & function code = 03& point 
address = b7 & (value < LL OR value > HH) 
4 Storage Tank Measurement Out-of-
bounds 
Response & function code = 03 & point 
address = e9 & (value < LL OR value > HH) 
5 Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of 
Change 
Response & function code = 03 & point 
address = b7 & slope > SLmax & slope != 0 
6 Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate 
of Change 
Response & function code = 03& point 
address = e9 & (M1-M0/T1-T0) > SLmax & 
slope != 0 
7 Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of 
Change 
Response & function code = 03 & point 
address = b7 & slope < SLmin & slope != 0 
8 Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate 
of Change 
Response & function code = 03& point 
address = e9& slope < SLmin & slope != 0 
9 Pipeline Constant Measurement Response & function code = 03& point 
address = b7& NC > T & SystemMode = 
AUTO 
10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State  pressure > HH & pump = ON & 
relief valve = CLOSED 
11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State pressure <  LL & (pump = OFF | 
relief valve = OPEN) 
12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level 
Critical State 
liquid level > HH & pump = ON 
13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level 
Critical State 
liquid level < LL & pump = OFF & system = 
ON 
14 Invalid CRC Count invalid CRC count > 5 in time window 5 
15 MODBUS Flood MODBUS Packet Count > 5 in time window 
5 
 
Rules 4.1 and 4.2 alert when sensor measurements 
are negative. These rules are system specific. Rule 
4.1 alerts for a negative pressure measurement for a 
pipeline system. Rule 4.2 alerts for a negative water 
level measurement for a storage system. In each 
case, the rule must be programmed with the function 
code used to read the measurement, the exact 
address of the point which stores the measurement 
the measurement, and the width of the measurement 
in bytes. There may be more than one function code 
used to poll the MODBUS server for a measurement. 
In this case, multiple instances of the rule can be 
created to cover each case. Also, often MODBUS 
clients will read many points in a single read. In this 
case, Rules 4.1 and 4.2 should be updated to check 
the correct set of bytes within the larger read 
payload. These rules are state-based because 
MODBUS read responses do not include the address 
which was read from. As such, the state based layer 
stores the read command details, including the read 
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start address and quantity, and uses this information 
within the rule. 
Rules 4.3 and 4.4 alert when process measurements 
are grossly out of bounds. These rules are system 
specific. Rule 4.3 alerts for an out-of-bounds 
pressure measurement for a pipeline system. Rule 
4.4 alerts for an out-of-bounds water level 
measurement for a storage system. Both rules are 
programmed with extreme limits for their respective 
process. These rules may be configured as rules if 
the extreme limits for the process are static or are 
changed infrequently. The extreme limits should be 
set relative to the alarm thresholds for the process 
measurement.  
Rules 4.5-4.8 alert if the rate of change of a sensor 
measurement exceeds or falls below specific 
maximum and minimums respectively. Rules 4.5 
and 4.6 alert for high rates of change. A high rate of 
change may be a symptom of a high slope attack or 
sporadic or random measurement injection attacks. 
As successive measurements are observed in 
network traffic, the most recent measurement value 
and the timestamp of the latest measurement are 
stored in the state based layer. As new measurements 
are observed, the rate of change of process 
measurements is calculated and compared with a 
predefined maximum rate of change value. The rate 
of change is calculated using equation 1, where M0 
is the current measurement, M1 the previous 
measurement, T1 is the time stamp of the current 
measurement, and T0 is the timestamp of the 
previous measurement. Control systems tend to poll 
sensor measurements periodically meaning T1-T0 
will be approximately constant. For Rules 4.5 and 
4.6, the term SLmax, in Table 4, is the maximum rate 
of change allowed. In some systems, separate 
maximum rates of change will be defined for the 
rising and falling measurement case. In such cases, 
two rules will be needed for each system. The 
maximum rate of change is system specific and must 
be defined in consultation with a system expert. This 
rule will not detect all sporadic and random sensor 
measurement injections since some injected 
measurements may be close enough to the previous 
value to not trigger the alert. However, during an 
extended attack many measurements will trigger an 
alert.  
         
01
01
TT
MM
slope


                                              
(1) 
Rules 4.7 and 4.8 alert for low rates of change. These 
rules detect low slope measurement injection 
attacks. Similar to the maximum rate of change, the 
minimum rate of change is system specific and 
system experts should be consulted when setting this 
limit. In many systems, acceptable minimum rate of 
change cannot be defined. In such cases, no 
minimum rate of change rule should be applied. Also 
many systems have a minimum rate of change with 
the exception that no change is an allowed condition. 
For this work, Rules 4.7 and 4.8 do not alert if the 
calculated slope is 0. 
Rule 4.9 alerts when a threshold of T consecutive 
packets is observed with the same process 
measurement. In the description of Rule 4.9, from 
Table 4, the variable NC is the count of consecutive 
packets without a measurement change. The state 
based layer calculates the count of consecutive 
packets without a process measurement change. The 
state based layer also stores the current process 
system mode (AUTO or MANUAL). Rule 4.9 only 
detects constant level injection attacks in system 
state in which the process measurement is known to 
change. For systems where the measurement may 
legally be constant, these rules are not applicable. A 
constant level injection attack may also be detected 
by the rate of change rules (Rules 4.6 and 4.7) if the 
injected measurement varies significantly from the 
measurement observed immediately before the 
attack initiates. Subsequent packets during the attack 
will not trigger alerts from the rate of change rules.   
Rules 4.10-4.13 monitor the physical process state 
and alert when the process is in a critical state. For 
this paper, a critical state is defined as a state of 
alarm in which the control settings will drive the 
system further away from a normal system state.  
Rule 4.10 alarms if the pipeline pressure is above the 
high level alarm set point (HH) and the pump is on 
and the relief valve is closed. Rule 4.11 alarms if the 
pipeline pressure is below the low level alarm set 
point (LL) and the pump is off or the relief valve is 
open. Rule 4.12 alarms if the storage tank liquid 
level is above the alarm set point (HH) and the pump 
is on. Rule 4.13 alarms if the storage tank liquid level 
is below the alarm set point (LL) and the pump is off 
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and the system is on. Each of these states should 
never occur. These IDS rules may alert due to an 
actual process fault which leads the system to a 
critical state or may occur due to a cyber-attack 
driving the process to a critical state via command 
injection attack. These state based rules will alert for 
some but not all cases of the altered system control 
scheme, altered actuator state, continually altered 
actuator state, altered proportional integral 
derivative parameter(s), and altered control set point 
command injection attacks. The rules will only alert 
if the command injection drives the process to a 
critical state. 
Rule 4.14 detects the invalid cyclic redundancy code 
(CRC) flood attack. MODBUS-RTU mode uses a 
16-bit CRC and MODBUS-ASCII uses an 8-bit 
longitudinal redundancy code (LRC). The functions 
to generate the MODBUS-RTU and MODBUS 
ASCII CRC and LRC respectively are available in 
the MODBUS over Serial Line Specification and 
Implementation Guide 9. Each packet is monitored 
in the state based layer. The CRC/LRC is calculated 
within the state based layer and compared to the 
CRC/LRC with the packet. A count of failed 
CRC/LRC over a time window is kept. If the number 
of failed CRC/LRC exceeds a programmable 
threshold an alert is issued. For this work, the time 
window was 1 seconds and the number of failed 
CRC required to trigger the rules was 2. 
The MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming Attack is 
detected with Rule 4.15. If the count of MODBUS 
packets in a given time window exceeds a threshold 
a flood alert is produced.  
 
Table 5 Signature based IDS Detection Results by Class 
 Pipeline System Storage System 
 Detection 
Rate 
False 
Positive 
Detection 
Rate 
False 
Positive 
Reconnaissance 98.7% 0.0% 98.7% 0.0% 
NMRI 95.4% 0.8% 94.2% 0.8% 
CMRI 92.5% 0.5% 93.7% 0.6% 
MSCI 89.8% 0.7% 90.1% 0.7% 
MPCI 93.1% 0.0% 93.0% 0.0% 
MFCI 100% 0.0% 100% 0.0% 
DOS 100% 0.0% 100% 0.0% 
Normal 99.5% - 99.5% - 
 
4.2 Snort Rule Validation 
Table 5 lists signature detection rate and false 
positive percentage for signature evaluation using 
the pipeline and storage systems. The results in 
Table 5 are presented by attack class.  
The detection rate for reconnaissance attacks was 
98.7% for the pipeline system and 98.7% for the 
storage tank system. A review of the misclassified 
attacks showed that the signature based IDS failed to 
detect the malicious packets that contain valid 
device ID, function codes, and read/write memory 
addresses. During a reconnaissance attack, attackers 
scan ranges of device addresses, function codes and 
memory addresses. These ranges contain valid 
device addresses, function codes and memory 
addresses which have been defined in white lists. 
The rules miss these malicious packets and do not 
trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the 
reconnaissance attacks was 0% for the pipeline 
control system and 0% for the storage tank control 
system. This means the signature based IDS does not 
misclassify the normal traffic or other types of attack 
as reconnaissance attacks.  
The detection rate for NMRI attacks was 95.4% for 
the pipeline system and 94.2% for the storage tank 
system. A review of the misclassified attack cases 
showed that the signature based IDS failed to detect 
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malicious packets that contain gas pressure 
measurements or water level measurements out of 
the bounds defined by the IDS rules. During the 
NMRI attack, when the malicious packet contains a 
false measurement that is very close (in time) to 
valid or true measurement, the malicious packet will 
not violate the IDS rules. The false positive rate for 
the NMRI attacks was 0.8% for the pipeline control 
system and 0.8% for the storage tank control system. 
A review of the false positive cases showed that the 
IDS misclassified some normal traffic packets as 
NMRI packets. Sometimes valid measurements fall 
outside the bounds set by Rules 4.3 and 4.4. These 
situations will trigger a false alarm. The same 
occurrence will trigger an alarm. Both the rules and 
alarm levels should be updated to better reflect 
system behavior. 
The detection rate for CMRI attacks was 92.5% for 
the pipeline control system and 93.7% for the 
storage tank control system. A review of the 
misclassified attack case showed two issues. CMRI 
attack detection heavily relies on the min max rate 
of process measurement change rules. It is hoped 
that the transition from normal unaltered 
measurements to altered measurements has a slope 
which violates state based Rules 4.6-4.9 thresholds. 
If an attack lasts multiple packets and within the 
attack measurements do not violate the state based 
Rules 4.6-4.9 thresholds those packets will be 
misclassified. The first packet of the attack may be 
detected but some packets within the attack may not 
be detected.  Second, if the state based Rules 4.6-4.9 
thresholds are not violated at all during the attack 
then the attack can go unnoticed. This is especially 
possible during the calculated and replay CMRI 
attacks. The false positive rate for the CMRI attacks 
was 0.5% for the pipeline system and 0.7% for the 
storage tank system. A review of false positive cases 
showed that the IDS misclassified some normal 
traffic as CMRI packets. The timestamp applied to 
packets is not added by the RTU PLC. The 
timestamp is added by a separate data logger 
process. The timestamp is sometimes incorrect due 
to the data logger computer becoming busy with 
other processes. This leads to incorrect rate of 
change values which trigger the minimum rate of 
change rules.   
The detection rate for MSCI attacks was 89.8% for 
the pipeline system and 90.1% for the storage tank 
system. A review of the misclassified attack cases 
showed that the IDS failed to detect some packets 
that contain malicious system state commands. The 
Snort rules defined ranges of the system parameters. 
When these crafted parameters were in the allowed 
range, the malicious packets were not detected. The 
false positive rate for the MSCI attacks was 0.7% for 
the pipeline system and 0.7% for the storage tank 
system. The false positive cases occur when alarm 
levels are set too close to the normal operating range 
of the system. These levels can be adjusted to 
minimize false positives. 
The detection rate for MPCI attacks was 93.1% for 
the pipeline control system and 93.0% for the 
storage tank control system. A review of the 
misclassified cases showed that the IDS failed to 
detect some MPCI packets that contained set point 
values that do not violate Rules 4.9-4.10. During an 
MPCI attack, when a malicious packet contains set 
point values within allowed ranges defined by Rules 
4.9-4.10 alerts are not triggered. The false positive 
rate for the MPCI attacks was 0% for the pipeline 
control system and 0% for the storage tank control 
system.  
The detection rate for MFCI attacks was 100% for 
the pipeline control system and 100 % for the storage 
tank control system. The false positive rate for the 
MFCI attacks was 0% for the pipeline control system 
and 0% for the storage tank control system. MFCI 
attacks require use of specific banned function and 
sub function codes and are therefore easily detected. 
The detection rate for DOS attacks was 100% for the 
pipeline control system and 100% for the storage 
tank control system. The false positive rate for the 
DOS attacks was 0% for the pipeline control system 
and 0% for the storage tank control system. High 
volumes of packets are easy to detect. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Industrial control systems are vulnerable to multiple 
types of network based attacks including 
reconnaissance, response injection, command 
injection, and denial of service attacks. This paper 
presents 28 network based attacks which target 
MODBUS systems. The attacks were implemented 
and tested against two control systems; a pipeline 
and storage tank system. The existence of such 
attacks drives the need for digital forensic systems 
which can capture and store evidence of attacks for 
intrusion detection and post incident forensic 
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analysis. This paper presents 18 standalone and 15 
state based IDS rules to detect the cyber attacks 
presented. Standalone rules monitor the contents of 
a single network frame to detect an attack. State 
based rules monitor multiple network packets to 
build up model of the present state of the 
communication protocol or the control system itself.  
Together standalone and state based rules provide a 
highly effective means to detect cyber attacks 
against control systems with low false positive rates. 
A great deal of industrial control system research 
centers around anomaly based and specification 
based IDS research. Signature based IDS are 
generally known quantities by the IDS research 
community and therefore may not be considered for 
use in industrial control systems. However, 
industrial control systems have regular 
communication patterns and predictable system state 
and control schemes. This regularity and 
predictability make them prime candidates for 
signature based IDS. Implementing the rules 
described in this paper, or similar rules for different 
types of control systems, can lead to a more secure 
critical infrastructure. Signature based IDS rules can 
be added as events occur and can be shared within 
industry and government to provide a level of 
protection that currently does not exist. Also, 
signature based IDS rules are easily adjustable and 
therefore can be customized for the specific system 
which they protect. Many control systems are 
designed and maintained by 3rd party system 
integrators. System integrators should be trained in 
the use of signature based IDS to provide a first line 
of protection for control systems. 
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